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Abstract
In this study we examine the dynamic structural relationship between oil price shocks and
stock market returns and volatility for a sample of both net oil–exporting and net oil–
importing countries between 1995:09 and 2013:07. We accomplish that, by extending the
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) dynamic spillover index using structural forecast error variance
decomposition. The results for both stock market returns and volatility suggest that spillover
effects vary across different time periods, and that this time–varying character is aligned
with certain developments that take place in the global economy. In particular, aggregate
demand shocks appear to act as the main transmitters of spillover effects to stock markets
during periods characterised by economic–driven events, while supply–side and oil–specific
demand shocks during periods of geopolitical unrest. Furthermore, differences regarding the
directions and the strength of spillover effects can be reported both between and within the
net oil–importing and net oil–exporting countries. These results are of particular importance
to investors and portfolio managers, given the recent financialisation of the oil market.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamic structural spillover effects between
oil price shocks and stock market returns and volatility, of major stock markets around the
world. To this end, we extend the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) spillover index in the following
way. Instead of using a generalized vector autoregressive framework in which forecast-error
variance decompositions are invariant to the variable ordering, we propose a structural vector
autoregressive framework that allows for the identification of the different oil price shocks.
The investigation of the time–varying spillover effects among oil price shocks and stock
market activity is important given the recent geopolitical unrest and the financialisation of
the oil market. According to Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin and Robe (2014), Hamilton and Wu (2014), Alquist
and Kilian (2010) and Fattouh (2010), investors and portfolio managers have increased their
positions in the oil market over the last decade or so. In this respect, identifying the
aforementioned time–varying spillover effects may be useful to market participants making
decisions about portfolio adjustments, asset pricing, as well as, the development of models
for forecasting.
Since the seminal paper by Jones and Kaul (1996) there is an ever increasing interest
to understand the effects of oil prices on stock markets (some recent studies include those
by Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2014; Asteriou and Bashmakova, 2013; Ciner, 2013; Lee and
Chiou, 2011; Laopodis, 2011; Filis, 2010; Chen, 2010; Miller and Ratti, 2009). In recent
years though, the literature has directed its attention to three different strands.
The first strand is related to the origin of oil price changes; that is, to whether oil prices
change due to supply-driven or demand-driven events. Pioneers in this line of inquiry are
Hamilton (2009a,b) and Kilian (2009) who, on general principles, argue that different oil
price shocks should trigger different responses from economic indicators and stock markets.
More specifically, Hamilton (2009a,b) classifies oil price changes (shocks) into supply–side
and demand–side shocks, depending on whether these can be attributed to changes in global
oil production or changes in global aggregate demand, respectively. Kilian (2009) provides
a further classification of demand–side shocks; that is, into aggregate demand shocks –
which have their origin in changes in global aggregate demand – and precautionary demand
shocks (or oil specific demand shocks) – which pertain to the uncertainty about the future
availability of oil. The findings by Hamilton (2009a,b) and Kilian (2009) suggest that, ag-
gregate demand shocks trigger positive responses from the economy, whereas the opposite
holds for precautionary demand shocks. On the other hand, supply–side shocks are signifi-
cantly less important for the economy. A wealth of literature supports the findings reported
by Hamilton (2009a,b) and Kilian (2009) and thus providing ample evidence suggesting
that supply–side shocks do not seem to affect financial markets, whereas positive aggregate
demand shocks (precautionary shocks) exert a positive (negative) impact (see, inter alia,
Degiannakis et al., 2014; Abhyankar et al., 2013; Kang and Ratti, 2013; Baumeister and
Peersman, 2013; Kilian and Park, 2009; Apergis and Miller, 2009).
The second and rather recent strand in the literature focuses on the time–varying relation-
ship between oil prices and stock markets. Authors, such as, Sadorsky (2014), Broadstock
and Filis (2014), Filis (2014), Chang et al. (2013), Antonakakis and Filis (2013), Sadorsky
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(2012), Broadstock et al. (2012), Filis et al. (2011) and Choi and Hammoudeh (2010),
subscribe to the belief that the relationship between oil and stock markets should not be
examined within a static framework but rather in a time–varying one, given that the nature
of this relationship changes at different points in time. Indicatively, Chang et al. (2013)
focusing on the US and the UK markets, show an increase in the correlation between oil and
stock market returns in the post–2008 period. Similar findings are reported by Sadorsky
(2014) for the emerging stock markets. Furthermore, Broadstock et al. (2012) also provide
evidence that the correlation between energy-related stock returns and changes in oil prices
exhibits a significant increase during the period of the Great Recession.
The third strand is associated with the spillover effects between the two markets under
consideration. This line of research purports to identify whether there are any volatility
spillovers between oil and stock markets, as well as, the direction of these spillovers (see,
among others, Chang et al., 2013; Mensi et al., 2013; Arouri et al., 2012, 2011a,b; Malik
and Ewing, 2009; Malik and Hammoudeh, 2007). To illustrate this, Mensi et al. (2013) and
Arouri et al. (2012) find significant volatility spillover effects between the oil market and
the US or the European stock markets, respectively. However, Mensi et al. (2013) suggest
that spillovers run from the S&P500 to the oil market, while Arouri et al. (2012) report that
the reverse is true for the case of the European stock market. Arouri et al. (2011b) provide
further evidence regarding the significant increase of the volatility spillover effects during the
global financial crisis. By contrast, Chang et al. (2013) do not report any volatility spillover
effects between the oil market and key global stock market indices (FTSE100, Dow Jones,
NYSE and S&P500).
The aim of this paper is to bring together the three aforementioned strands of existing
literature. That is, we concentrate on the time–varying spillover effects between the three
different types of oil price shocks and 11 major global stock markets for the period September
1995 to July 2013. In particular, we examine the time–varying effects between oil price shocks
and stock market returns, as well as the time–varying effects between oil price shocks and
stock market volatility – by considering two current measures of volatility (i.e. conditional
and realised volatility) and one forward-looking measure (i.e. implied volatility). It should be
noted that the implied volatility measure is mainly introduced to the analysis for robustness
purposes. As mentioned earlier, we extend the spillover index approach by Diebold and
Yilmaz (2012) for the purpose of our study. Specifically, instead of using the generalised
vector autoregressive framework, we propose a structural variance decomposition, that allows
us to identify the supply-driven, demand-driven and aggregate demand oil market shocks.
Our study builds upon the study of Awartani and Maghyereh (2013), who employ a similar
methodology in an attempt to investigate the spillover effects between oil prices (i.e. instead
of oil price shocks disaggregated by virtue of their origin as in our study) and GCC stock
market returns. It is worth mentioning that the results reported by Awartani and Maghyereh
(2013) suggest the existence of important spillover effects flowing from oil prices to the GCC
markets but not the reverse, and that spillover effects increase considerably during the global
economic crisis.
As discussed below, our results stress the necessity to investigate spillover effects between
oil prices and the stock market both over time and by disaggregating oil price shocks by
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virtue of their origin. In particular, we show that spillover effects vary across different time
periods and that this time-varying character is aligned with certain developments that take
place in the global economy. In this regard, aggregate demand shocks appear to act as
the main transmitters of spillover effects to stock markets during periods of economic and
financial uncertainty, while supply-side and oil-specific demand shocks during periods of
geopolitical unrest.
On a secondary level, we provide evidence that differences regarding the direction and
the strength of the effects can be found both between and among the two groups of countries
under investigation (i.e. net oil–importing and net oil–exporting countries) emphasizing the
fact that these differences mainly pertain to the time–varying character of the relationship
between oil prices and the stock market. On a final note, our results indicate no notable
differences between the alternative proxies of stock market volatility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology
and describes the data. Section 3 presents the empirical findings, while Section 4 provides an
in-depth discussion of the findings. Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes the paper.
2. Methodology and Data
2.1. Spillover methodology
The spillover index approach introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) builds on the seminal
work on VAR models by Sims (1980) and the well-known notion of variance decompositions.
It allows an assessment of the contributions of shocks to variables to the forecast error
variances of both the respective and the other variables of the model. Using rolling-window
estimation, the evolution of spillover effects can be traced over time and illustrated by
spillover plots. Starting point for the analysis is the following p–order, N–variable VAR
yt =
P∑
i=1
Θiyt−i + εt (1)
where yt = (y1t, y2t, . . . , yNt) is a N × 1 vector of N endogenous variables, Θi, i = 1, ..., P,
are N × N parameter matrices and εt ∼ (0,Σ) is a N × 1 vector of disturbances that are
independently distributed over time; t = 1, ..., T is the time index and n = 1, ..., N is the
variable index.
Key to the dynamics of the system is the moving average representation of model (1),
which is given by yt =
∑∞
j=0 Ajεt−j, where the N×N coefficient matrices Aj are recursively
defined as Aj = Θ1Aj−1 + Θ2Aj−2 + . . .+ ΘpAj−p, where A0 is the N ×N identity matrix
and Aj = 0 for j < 0.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) use Cholesky decomposition, which yields variance decom-
positions dependent on the ordering of the variables, whereas Diebold and Yilmaz (2012)
extend the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) model, using the generalized VAR framework of Koop
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), in which variance decompositions are invariant
to the order of the variables. Both models yield an N ×N matrix φ(H) = [φij(H)]i,j=1,...N ,
where each entry gives the contribution of variable j to the forecast error variance of variable
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i. The main diagonal elements contain the (own) contributions of shocks to the variable i
to its own forecast error variance, the off-diagonal elements show the (cross) contributions
of the other variables j to the forecast error variance of variable i.
Since the own– and cross–variable variance contribution shares do not sum to one under
the generalized decomposition, i.e.,
∑N
j=1 φij(H) 6= 1, each entry of the variance decomposi-
tion matrix is normalized by its row sum, such that
φ˜ij(H) =
φij(H)∑N
j=1 φij(H)
(2)
with
∑N
j=1 φ˜ij(H) = 1 and
∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H) = N by construction.
This ultimately allows to define a total (volatility) spillover index, which is given by
TS(H) =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)
N
× 100 (3)
which gives the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all (other) variables to the
total forecast error variance.
This approach is quite flexible and allows to obtain a more differentiated picture by
considering directional spillovers: Specifically, the directional spillovers received by variable
i from all other variables j are defined as
DSi←j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)
N
× 100 (4)
and the directional spillovers transmitted by variable i to all other variables j as
DSi→j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ji(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)
N
× 100. (5)
Notice that the set of directional spillovers provides a decomposition of total spillovers into
those coming from (or to) a particular source.
By subtracting Equation (4) from Equation (5) the net spillovers from variable i to all
other variables j are obtained as
NSi(H) = DSi→j(H)−DSi←j(H), (6)
providing information on whether a variable is a receiver or transmitter of shocks in net
terms. Put differently, Equation (6) provides summary information about how much each
variable contributes to the volatility in other variables, in net terms.
Finally, the net pairwise spillovers can be calculated as
NPSij(H) = (
φ˜ji(H)∑N
i,m=1 φ˜im(H)
− φ˜ij(H)∑N
j,m=1 φ˜jm(H)
)× 100
= (
φ˜ji(H)− φ˜ij(H)
N
)× 100. (7)
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The net pairwise volatility spillover between variables i and j is simply the difference between
the gross volatility shocks transmitted from variable i to variable j and those transmitted
from j to i.
The spillover index approach provides measures of the intensity of interdependence across
countries and variables and allows a decomposition of spillover effects by source and recipient.
This study is based on the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) approach. However, a key method-
ological innovation and contribution of the study is that, instead of using the generalised
vector autoregressive framework, we adopt a structural vector autoregressive framework, as
it allows for the identification of the oil price shocks. Thus, the choice of structural variance
decomposition is predicated upon our empirical exercise. That is, to examine the effects of
oil price shocks on stock market returns and volatility. In particular, we disaggregate oil
price shocks based on the framework of Kilian and Park (2009). Essentially, with the use
of a Structural VAR (SVAR) model, we distinguish between three types of oil price shocks;
namely, supply–side shocks (SS), aggregate demand demand (ADS), as well as, oil specific
demand shocks (OSS); and by including stock market returns (volatility) in the SVAR, we
assess the effects of oil price shocks on stock market returns (volatility).
For the general case of a pth–order Structural VAR model, we obtain the following stan-
dard representation:
A0yt = c0 +
∑p
i=1
Aiyt−i + εt (8)
where, yt is a [N × 1] vector of endogenous variables. In this paper, N=4, containing
world oil production, the global economic activity index, real oil price returns and the stock
market returns (volatility) of the respective country, noting that the order of the variables is
important. A0 represents the [N×N ] contemporaneous matrix, Ai are [N×N ] autoregressive
coefficient matrices, εt is a [N × 1] vector of structural disturbances, assumed to have zero
covariance and be serially uncorrelated. The covariance matrix of the structural disturbances
takes the following form:
E[εtε
′
t] = D =

σ21 0 0 0
0 σ22 0 0
0 0 σ23 0
0 0 0 σ24
 (9)
In order to get the reduced form of our structural model (8) we multiply both sides with
A−10 , such as that:
yt = a0 +
∑p
i=1
Biyt−i + et (10)
where a0 = A
−1
0 c0, Bi = A
−1
0 Ai, and et = A
−1
0 εt, i.e. εt = A0et. The reduced form errors
et are linear combinations of the structural errors et, with a covariance matrix of the form
E[ete
′
t] = A
−1
0 DA
−1′
0 .
Imposing suitable restrictions on A−10 allows us to identify the structural disturbances
of the model. In particular, we impose the following short-run restrictions:
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
e∆Oil Production1,t
e
Real Global Economic Activity
2,t
e∆Real Oil Prices3,t
e
Stock Market Returns (Volatility)
4,t
 =

α11 0 0 0
α21 α22 0 0
α31 α32 α33 0
α41 α42 α43 α44
×

εSS1,t
εADS2,t
εOSS3,t
ε
SMR(SMV )
4,t
 (11)
where SS is the supply–side shock, ADS is the aggregate demand shock, OSS is the oil
specific demand shock, and SMR (SMV ) is the stock market returns (volatility) shock.
The purpose of the short–run restrictions we impose on the model is to help us identify
the underlying oil price shocks, similarly with Kilian and Park (2009). According to the
restrictions for N=4, high adjustment costs forbid oil production to contemporaneously re-
spond to changes in demand for oil. Furthermore, changes in the supply of oil are allowed
to contemporaneously affect both global economic activity and the price of oil. In addition,
given that it takes some time for the global economy to react to changes in the price of oil,
global economic activity is assumed not to receive contemporaneous feedback from oil prices.
However, changes in aggregate economic activity is expected to have a contemporaneous im-
pact on oil prices and this is largely explained by the instantaneous response of commodities
markets. Furthermore, it is understandable that oil price developments can be triggered by
all types of shocks and in this regard all types of shocks are assumed to contemporaneously
affect oil prices. Finally, stock market returns (volatility) respond contemporaneously to all
aforementioned oil price shocks.
2.2. Data description
We collect monthly data of stock market indices for major oil–importing and oil– exporting
countries, namely, Canada (S&P/TSX), China (SSE), ESP (IBEX35), France (CAC40),
Germany (DAX30), Italy (FTSEITA), Japan (NIKKEI225), Norway (OSE), Russia (RTS)
the UK (FTSE100) and the US (S&P500) from Datastream. The stock market indices series
are converted into stock market returns using the first difference of the natural logarithms.
The motivation for the choice of these countries stems from the literature. Specifically,
empirical evidence shows that the impact of oil price changes (shocks) on a particular stock
market depends on whether the country, that the market is operating in, is a net oil–importer
or a net oil–exporter. For instance, Wang et al. (2013); Mohanty et al. (2011); Bjørnland
(2009) claim that positive oil prices changes trigger positive responses for the stock markets
of net oil–exporting countries, whereas the opposite stands true for the stock markets of the
net oil–importers. Thus, in order to capture any possible heterogenous behaviour, our sample
consists of the main net oil–importers and net oil–exporters of the world. In addition, we
collect monthly data for oil prices, world oil production and the real global economic activity
index (GEA), which are used for the estimation of the oil price shocks. Data for the Brent
crude oil price and world oil production have been extracted from the Energy Information
Administration, whereas the data for the real global economic activity index have been
retrieved from Lutz Kilian’s personal website (http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼lkilian/).
The time period of study runs from 1995:09 until 2013:07. Oil prices and world oil production
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are expressed in log-returns. Furthermore, oil prices are transformed in real terms. Table 1
reports the descriptive statistics of the series.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
According to Table 1, all stock markets returns are positive on average, apart from
Japan, where negative returns are recorded. Stock market returns exhibit some variability,
as shown by the standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum values. In particular,
stock market returns in Russia are the most volatile, while stock market returns in the US
are the least volatile. With regard to oil price changes, we observe a positive mean value,
with quite a high standard deviation. In addition, none of the series is normally distributed,
as indicated by the skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque–Bera statistic. Finally, according to
the ADF–statistic, all variables are stationary.
Figures 1 and 2 exhibit the evolution of the series during the sample period. All stock
market returns exhibit some common troughs. To be more explicit, in all markets we notice
the significant negative impact of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. In addition, we observe
that for most European stock markets, a second important trough is observed during the first
few months of the European debt crisis in 2010. Furthermore, stock market volatilities also
exhibit common patterns. More importantly, we observe the peak of volatility during the
period 2007–2009, signifying the turmoil that the Great Recession brought to these markets.
However, a second peak in the European stock market volatilities is noticed during the early
stages of the ongoing European debt crisis. Finally, the effects of the Great Recession are
also evident on the changes of oil production, global economic activity, as well as, on oil
price changes, where a significant decline is observed.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Oil price shocks and stock market returns
3.1.1. Total spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market returns
The spillover effects between stock market returns and disaggregated oil price shocks within
countries are presented in Table 2. According to these results we observe that on average
the total spillover indices range between 18.7% (UK) and 25.8% (Norway), indicating a
moderate interdependence between oil market shocks and stock market returns for most
countries. On average, net spillovers for the whole sample reveal that stock market returns
are net transmitters of shocks in Canada, China, Spain, Germany, Japan, Norway and in
Russia, while in France, Italy, the UK and the US, stock market returns act as net receivers
of spillover effects from oil price shocks (see, Table 2). Among oil price shocks, aggregate
demand shocks are generally net transmitters (with the exception of China and Russia),
while supply–side shocks and oil–specific demand shocks are generally on the receiving ends
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of spillovers (with the exception of Germany, Italy, Norway and the UK in terms of the
former shocks, and of Canada and Spain in terms of the latter shocks). These results are in
line with the literature that emphasises the importance of demand–side shocks, as opposed
to supply–side shocks (see, among others, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Lippi and Nobili,
2012; Hamilton, 2009a,b).
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Despite the fact that Table 2 reveals some interesting patterns on the link between oil
price shocks and stock market returns, we should not lose sight of the fact that during our
sample period several economic, financial and geopolitical events took place, which impacted
both the oil and the stock markets (e.g. the dot–com bubble in early the2000s, the war in
Iraq in 2003, the Great Recession of 2007–2009, the ongoing European debt crisis of 2010 and
Arab uprising which began in 2010 and was subsequently succeeded by a series of geopolitical
events such as the Libyan civil war in 2011 and the Syrian unrest of 2013). Hence, the average
values presented in Table 2 are not expected to hold for the whole time span. Thus, it would
be valuable to examine how these spillovers evolve over time. Therefore we proceed with
our analysis by presenting the total and net spillovers using 60–month rolling samples.1
The time–varying spillover indices are illustrated in Figure 3. As expected, total spillovers
between in stock market returns shocks and oil price shocks behave rather heterogeneously
over time and across countries. The range for the total spillover plots span from values as low
as 45% to values as high as 80% in almost all countries, implying that total spillovers between
oil price shocks and stock market returns do not remain constant; although a relative flat
trend is observed at around 60% level. This is suggestive of the fact that throughout the
sample period, regardless the economic or geopolitical conditions, spillovers between the oil
price shocks and stock market returns are important.
Furthermore, spillovers seem to peak during periods of economic turbulence and geopo-
litical unrest, such as, the Great Recession, the 2nd war in Iraq and the Start of the Arab
Spring. Nevertheless, the peaks which are observed during the Great Recession period are
unprecedent only for the net oil–exporting countries. This result confirms the findings by
Awartani and Maghyereh (2013) who reported that spillover effects between oil and GCC
stock markets (net oil–exporters) peaked during the period of the Great Recession. Another
interesting observation that can be made from Figure 3 is that a peak is observed in spillovers
for Russia and China in 2012 (i.e. during the escalation of the Syrian Civil War), whereas
for all other countries, spillovers either decline or fluctuate at relatively stable levels.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
1It should be underlined that different forecast horizons (from 5 up to 15 months) and different window
lengths (48 and 72) were also considered and the results were qualitatively similar (results are available from
the authors upon request). Thus, we maintain that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the forecast
horizon and/or the length of the rolling–windows.
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3.1.2. Directional spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market returns
In an attempt to further disentangle the link between oil price shocks and stock market
returns, we estimate model (1) using 60–month rolling windows and compute the time-
varying directional spillovers from (to) each variable to (from) all others, as defined in
equations (4)–(5). The directional spillovers from (to) each variable to (from) all others are
presented in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 around here]
Starting with the supply–side shocks (SS), we observe a structural break in their contri-
bution to spillover effects in the post–2009 period. In particular, low spillover effects exist
until 2009, whereas an increasing pattern in spillover effects deriving from oil–supply shocks
is evident thereafter, reaching a peak towards the end of the Great Recession. Notably,
the peak for all European countries of our sample is evident almost two years later, at the
end of 2010, i.e. immediately after the outbreak of the Eurozone debt crisis. A similar
behaviour (although from the reverse angle) is observed in terms of spillover effects towards
the supply–side shocks. These spillovers exhibit a stable pattern at about 20% level until
2009 (where a peak in reached), while a decline is observed thereafter (at the levels of about
10-15%).
A structural break is also evident in the spillover effects from and to aggregate demand
shocks (ADS). More specifically, spillovers from aggregate demand shocks are high until
2009 (at about 25-50% level), when these spillovers reach their peak, whereas a continued
decline is observed in the post–Great Recession period (the only exception is Russia). In
terms of the spillover effects to aggregate demand shocks we notice that they are volatile
and heterogeneous among countries until 2009, whereas a stable and increasing pattern is
noticeable thereafter.
Furthermore, spillover effects associated with oil–specific demand shocks (OSS) appear
to decline remarkably during the peak years of the Great Recession with the exception of
Japan. On the other hand, for all countries of our sample, the magnitude of spillover effects
received by oil–specific demand shocks is relatively stable, at about 20%.
Considering spillover effects from stock market returns (SMR) shocks, we observe that
they tend to fluctuate at the level of about 25% reaching, though, a trough in 2009 (although
the reverse holds true for Russia). At the other end of the spectrum, stock market returns
receive spillover effects at a rather stable pattern, reaching a spike at the heart of the Great
Recession (with the exception of Italy).
In the section that follows, we provide additional information aiming to attain deeper
knowledge of the evolution of spillover effects. To do so we concentrate on the net spillovers
and net pairwise spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market returns.
3.1.3. Net spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market returns
By concentrating on net spillovers we can deduce whether one of the variables is either a
net transmitter or a net receiver of spillover effects within a particular country. We thus
proceed by examining the net spillover effects between stock market returns and oil price
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shocks. Initially, we concentrate on the nature (i.e. net transmitter or net recipient) of each
one of the variables of interest in contrast with all other variables. The variable of interest
is considered to be a net transmitter of spillover effects when the line lies within the positive
upper part of each panel. Results are shown in Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 around here]
As can be seen in Figure 6, in the early period of our study and until the peak of
the Great Recession, supply–side (SS) and oil–specific demand shocks (OSS) assume a net
receiving role, whereas the reverse holds true for the aggregate demand shocks (ADS).
From that point onward, the opposite roles are observed where supply–side and oil–specific
demand shocks assume a net transmitting role for the largest part of this period (with the
exception of Russia), whereas aggregate demand shocks (ADS) become net receivers. In
addition, the net spillovers for the supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks are relatively
low compared with these of the aggregate demand shocks. The latter shocks reach a peak
in the net transmission of shocks during the Great Recession. Overall, these results suggest
that aggregate demand shocks (ADS) are more important compared to supply–side (SS)
and (OSS) oil–specific demand shocks, in terms of their magnitude. This is in line with
Basher et al. (2012); Filis et al. (2011); Kilian and Park (2009), among others, who also find
evidence in favour of the importance of aggregate demand shocks.
Turning to stock market returns (SMR) shocks, these appear to be relatively stable in
terms of magnitude throughout the period of study. However, in most countries they seem
to frequently switch between a net transmitting and a net receiving role.
The net spillover effects, defined in equation (6), have highlighted the importance of
the aggregate demand shocks in this particular framework of study. However, we have not
disentangled whether the net transmitting/receiving role of these spillover effects is related
to stock market returns or to any of the remaining two oil price shocks. Thus, we need to
extend our dynamic analysis in order to uncover the net spillovers between each of the oil
price shocks and stock market returns, concentrating on net pairwise spillover effects, defined
in equation (7), (see Figure 7). We should note that stock market returns are considered
to be net transmitters (receivers) of spillover effects when the net spillovers receive negative
(positive) values.
[Insert Figure 7 around here]
According to Figure 7, which reports the net pairwise spillover effects, stock market
returns (SMR) shocks appear to be net transmitters of spillover effects to supply–side shocks
(SS) throughout the pre–Great Recession period. The reverse picture is observed from
2009 onwards, when in most countries it is the supply–side shocks that assume the net
transmitting role.
Pertaining to the relation between stock market returns (SMR) shocks and aggregate
demand shocks (ADS), apparently, in the pre–Great Recession period, the latter, clearly
transmit spillover effects to the former. With the exception of Russia, this pattern reaches
a climax during the peak years of the Great Recession, while in the post–Great Recession
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period and up until 2012 stock market returns act as net recipients of spillover effects from
aggregate demand shocks (although this does not hold for China, whose stock market returns
shocks transmit spillover effects immediately after the Great Recession). Post–2012 stock
market returns shocks clearly assume a net transmitting role with respect to aggregate
demand shocks, for all countries.
Considering net spillover effects between stock market returns (SMR) shocks and oil–
specific demand shocks (OSS), these appear to be rather low (with Russia being a notable
exception) in the pre–Great Recession period, with the stock market being the net trans-
mitter of shocks. Nevertheless, for most of the period after the 2009, stock market returns
become net receivers of shocks from the oil–specific demand shocks. This holds for all
countries apart from Russia.
On a final note, there is no clear-cut evidence of any substantial differences between
net oil–exporting and net oil–importing countries. Nevertheless, Russia seems to exhibit a
different behaviour, compared to its group.
3.2. Oil price shocks and stock market volatility
3.2.1. Total spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market realized volatility
Apart from investigating the various linkages between oil price shocks and stock market
returns, our study further purports to explore the relation between oil price shocks and
stock market uncertainty. We use realized volatility as our measure of current–looking
volatility.2
Starting with Table 3, we observe that the total spillover indices range from 15.8%
(China) to 21.3% (Italy). As in the case of stock market returns, this suggests that a moder-
ate interdependence exists between disaggregated oil price shocks and realized volatility. The
directional spillover effects indicate that realized volatility and aggregate demand shocks are
the main transmitters, whereas the opposite holds true for supply–side and and oil–specific
demand shocks. Nevertheless, on average, the stock market volatilities of Canada, China
and the US seem to be at the receiving ends of spillovers during the period of the study.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
In order to be consistent with our analysis of the previous section, we also have to
consider the evolution of spillovers across time. The cornerstone for the presentation of our
empirical findings is again the crisis of 2007–2009 along with some major geopolitical events
that took place during the sample period. The time–varying spillover indices for the realized
volatility are illustrated in Figure 8.
[Insert Figure 8 around here]
2We have also explored the robustness of our results based on another backward–looking measure of
volatility, namely, conditional volatility, and the results remain qualitatively very similar with these of the
realized volatility. Thus, for the sake of brevity, these results are not presented, but are available upon
request.
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As with stock market returns, Figure 8 shows that the total spillover plots assume values
as low as 45% and as high as 85%. This implies that quite a few peaks and troughs of total
spillovers between oil price shocks and realized volatility can indeed be reported throughout
the period of study. In particular, total spillover indices reach a peak at the heart of the
Great Recession for all countries of our sample, although, this peak is not unprecedented.
In truth, similar values can be reported in all countries, both during the pre– and the
post–Great Recession period. For instance, we notice that the highest spillover effects for
Russia appear in mid–2010 (e.g. during the start of Arab Spring), whereas for Italy and
China, in 2005 and 2011, respectively. This suggests that the Great Recession triggered
significant spillover effects among oil price shocks and stock market volatility; nonetheless,
similar behaviour can be traced during other events, as well, (e.g. during the escalation of
the Syrian Civil war between November 2011 and March 2012, and in February 2006, when
the Nigerian military launched several raids against oil militants), at different time periods.
Furthermore, there is no significant differences in the behaviour of these spillovers between
net oil–importing and net oil–exporting countries.
Despite the fact that some interesting patterns are observed in the total spillover plots,
it is the directional and net spillovers which will allow us to understand better the nature
of the spillover effects among oil price shocks and stock market volatility.
3.2.2. Directional spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market realized volatility
In an attempt to further disentangle the link between oil market shocks and stock market
realised volatility we focus on the time–varying directional spillovers from (to) each variable
to (from) all others, as defined in equations (4) and (5). The directional spillovers from (to)
each variable to (from) all others are presented in Figures 9 and 10, respectively.
[Insert Figures 9 and 10 around here]
Starting with the supply–side shocks (SS), these appear to contribute considerably in
the years during the Great Recession for the oil–importing countries and during 2010–2011
for the oil–exporting countries. We notice, though, that some exemptions exist among
the net oil–importing countries (i.e. China, Japan and the US), as a peak is reached in
these countries immediately after the period of the Great Recession, resembling the spillover
patterns of the net oil–exporting countries. By contrast, supply–side shocks receive spillover
effects mainly in the pre–Great Recession period.
Turning to aggregate demand shocks (ADS), these contribute considerably to spillover
effects in all other variables in the pre–Great Recession period. Furthermore, with the
exception of Russia, the UK and the US, spillover effects generated by aggregate demand
shocks attain a peak at the heart of the financial crisis. On the other hand, aggregate
demand shocks appear to receive spillover effects throughout the period of study without
following a stable path.
As far as the oil–specific demand shocks (OSS) are concerned, they seem to contribute
more in the years that followed the Great Recession, while all other variables tend to instigate
spillover effects to oil–specific demand shocks at a rather stable pace throughout the period
of study, reaching a peak during the years of the Great Recession.
13
Considering the stock market realized volatility (SMRV) shocks, results regarding effects
from this variable to all other variables seem to be country specific. Nonetheless, we note
that in all European countries a peak is reached in the years immediately before the onset of
the Great Recession. Turning to spillover effects exerted on stock market realized volatility,
these appear to be rather stable (at about 10-20% level) throughout the period of study,
reaching a peak at the heart of the Great Recession.
In the next section, we conclude the exposition of our results by considering net spillover
and net pairwise spillover effects between stock market realized volatility and oil price shocks.
3.2.3. Net spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market realized volatility
Net spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market realized volatility are shown in
Figure 11. Each variable of interest acts as a net transmitter of spillover effects when net
spillovers receive positive values.
[Insert Figure 11 around here]
Figure 11 reveals that the supply–side shocks (SS) are mainly net recipients of spillover
effects in the period which preceded the Great Recession. By contrast, in the years that
followed the crisis, supply–side shocks switch to net transmitters. In point of fact, with only
a few exceptions (i.e. Canada, China, Japan and Norway) the transition occurs in 2009. It
is also worth mentioning that at the heart of the crisis all net oil–exporting countries of our
sample, along with China, Japan and to a lesser extend the US, exhibit a trough. On the
other hand, European countries appear to attain a peak for the same period.
As far as the aggregate demand shocks (ADS) are concerned, these act as net transmitters
of spillover effects in almost all countries, for the largest part of our sample period. As a
matter of fact, at the heart of the crisis a peak is reached. Apparently, though, in the
post–2012 period, aggregate demand shocks switch to net recipients of spillover effects and
this holds for all countries of our sample.
The reverse is true for oil–specific demand shocks (OSS). These shocks mainly assume
a net receiving role, which appears to be quite persistent as it is evidenced throughout the
period before and immediately after the crisis. This role reaches a trough for most countries
at the heart of the crisis. In the post–2012 period, however, oil–specific demand shocks
clearly assume a rather net transmitting role in all countries but China.
Regarding the stock market realized volatility (SMRV) shocks, in the period before the
years of the Great Recession it assumes either roles, although specifically in the years imme-
diately before the beginning of the crisis realised volatility clearly assumes a net transmitting
role (with the exception of Japan and Russia). Furthermore, with the exception of Canada,
Russia and the US, there is again a transition at the heart of the crisis in which realised
volatility reaches a trough. Interestingly enough, in the post–2012 period realised volatility
is mainly a net recipient of spillover effects and this holds for all countries but China and
Russia.
Turning to pairwise net spillover effects, results are illustrated in Figure 12. Realized
volatility is considered to be net transmitter (receiver) of spillover effects when the line lies
within the negative lower (positive upper) part of each panel.
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[Insert Figure 12 around here]
Focusing on the net oil–exporting countries we observe that the realized volatility is a
net transmitter of spillover effects to supply–side (SS) and oil–specific demand shocks (OSS)
until the peak years of the Great Recession. After 2009 the reverse relationship is observed
as both supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks assume a net transmitting role. The
aggregate demand shocks (ADS) appear to transmit spillover effects to realized volatility
throughout the study period (Russia being the only exception). A change in this behaviour
is observed in the post–2012 period when realized volatility assumes a net transmitting role.
The behaviour of the pairwise spillover effects between stock market realized volatility
and supply–side shocks for the net oil–importing countries resembles that of the net oil–
exporters. The same observation can be made for the oil–specific demand shocks, with the
exception of China. Thus, overall, even for the oil–importing countries, realized volatility
is a net transmitter of spillover effects to supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks until
2009, when the reverse behaviour preponderates. The relation between realized volatility
and aggregate demand shocks is rather more heterogeneous. In most countries, realized
volatility assumes a net receiving role which peaks during the years of the Great Recession.
By contrast, in the post–2012 period, realized volatility mainly transmits spillover effects to
aggregate demand shocks. Same notable exceptions include the Germany and the US stock
market realized volatility which transmit spillover effects to aggregate demand shocks, both
several years before and during the Great Recession period.
3.3. Robustness
Given that the realised volatility of stock market returns is regarded as a current–looking
measure of volatility, we reiterate the analysis between oil price shocks and forward–looking
volatility, with the later now being approximated by the implied volatility of stock mar-
ket options. According to Koopman et al. (2005), implied volatility is more informational
efficient and thus it could provide additional information on the spillover effects between
oil price shocks and stock market volatility. Implied volatility represents the market’s ex-
pectation of stock market volatility over the next 30–day period, and as such, can provide
additional insights for market participants’ expectations on the link between oil price shocks
and stock market volatility.
As the availability of implied volatility indices is rather limited, and our econometric
approach very data intensive, we restrict our analysis only to the stock market indices for
which implied volatilities exist from the 1990s. In particular, the countries (implied volatility
series) that fulfill these criteria are France (VCAC), Germany (VDAX), Japan (VXJ), the
UK (VFTSE) and the US (VIX).
As shown in Figure 2, the implied volatility indices are highly correlated with the realised
and conditional measures of volatility. It is also evident that the implied volatility measure
is relatively smoother than the realised volatility one.
The results based on the implied volatility measure are presented in Table 4. This
table reveals that the total directional spillover indices range within 20% (Germany) and
27.6% (the UK). These levels suggest that, for some countries, total spillovers are of greater
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magnitude when the implied volatility is considered than total spillovers based on realized
volatility. Results again indicate a moderate interdependence among the variables of interest.
The results for the directional spillovers, as well as the net spillovers are similar with these
of the realized volatility reported in the previous section.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
The time–varying spillover effects are reported in Figure 13. Directional spillover effects
(FROM and TO), net spillovers and net pairwise spillovers are shown in Figures 14, 15, 16
and 17, respectively.
[Insert Figure 13 around here]
[Insert Figures 14 around here]
[Insert Figures 15 around here]
[Insert Figure 16 around here]
[Insert Figure 17 around here]
According to Figures 13–17, one can clearly observe their similarity to the respective
implied volatility spillover plots.
Overall, some important conclusions that can be extracted from the spillover effects
among oil price shocks and stock market volatility (realized or implied). First, there are
no notable differences among the historical and the forward–looking measures of volatility,
suggesting that implied volatility does not provide any superior information compared to the
realized and/or conditional volatility. Second, we notice that net oil–exporting countries tend
to exhibit somewhat different patterns of spillover effects compared to the net oil–importing
countries. Third, it is evident that spillover effects on three net oil–importers, namely,
China, Japan and the US exhibit similar behaviour with these of the net–oil exporters.
So far, we have presented the results from the spillover effects between oil price shocks
and stock market returns and volatilities in a descriptive way. In the next section, we provide
an in-depth analysis of these findings, in an effort to better understand these spillover effects.
4. Discussion
In order to gain a clearer understanding of the aforementioned relations, we now proceed with
the interpretation of the formerly reported results. For the sake of brevity, our discussion
builds on the empirical findings relating to pairwise net spillover effects, ensuring though,
that no important information is left out. In particular, we seek to identify which type
of oil price shocks appears to be more important for the stock market, especially at times
of recession or geopolitical turbulence. Neverthelss, country–specific analysis is also being
reported, so as to trace the distinct dynamics of spillover effects emanating from oil price
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shocks to the stock market of each country in our sample. As formerly mentioned, the
cornerstone of our analysis is the Great Recession of 2007–2009; whereas, recent economic
and geopolitical developments (i.e. the post–2010 period) are also of major concern. On
a final note, our discussion revolves around the net pairwise spillover results illustrated in
Figures 7 and 12.
Prominent among our results is the fact that in the period before and during the Great
Recession, aggregate demand shocks act mainly as net transmitters of spillover effects to
stock market returns and volatility. On the other hand, oil–specific demand shocks appear to
act as net transmitters of shocks in the post–Great recession period. It is worth mentioning
again, though, that the spillovers from oil–specific demand shocks exhibit an increasing
importance.
In close relation to this, authors such as (see, inter alia Basher et al., 2012; Filis et al.,
2011; Kilian and Park, 2009), have already reported the increasing effects of the demand–side
oil price shocks (but more importantly of the aggregate demand shocks) on stock market
performance. In addition, our findings offer support to Degiannakis et al. (2014) who report
that aggregate demand shocks affect stock market volatility.
The general consensus regarding this relationship is that positive aggregate demand
shocks are regarded as positive news about economic activity and as such, trigger positive
developments in the stock market. These positive developments are not only reflected by
higher stock market returns (see, inter alia, Wang et al., 2013; Kilian and Park, 2009), but
also by lower stock market volatility (Degiannakis et al., 2014). In this context, the fact that
during the Great Recession aggregate demand shocks are primarily transmitting spillovers
to stock market returns and volatility, reveals that the negative aggregate demand shocks
observed during this period, trigger negative responses from the stock markets and increase
uncertainty. Furthermore, Bloom (2009) from a different standpoint, provides additional
evidence to support the argument that negative news about global economic activity are
likely to increase volatility in the stock market.
Moreover, the fact that oil–specific demand shocks are transmitting shocks to the stock
markets in the post–Great Recession period, relates to the recent events in Syria and Libya,
which raised concerns about the geopolitical stability of Middle East. Typically, such events
raise concerns about the future availability of oil triggering significant oil–specific demand
shocks, which drive stock market returns (volatility) in lower (higher) levels.
Another interesting finding is that during the last few months of the Great Recession
and thereafter, stock market returns and volatilities are net recipients of spillover effects
from supply–side shocks, although these effects are not very pronounced. These findings are
not in line with previous studies who have demonstrated the insignificant effects of supply–
side shocks in stock markets (see, inter alia Degiannakis et al., 2014; Basher et al., 2012;
Filis et al., 2011). The consensus is that supply–side shocks do not cause any effects in the
stock markets given that OPEC’s decision regarding changes in oil supply are anticipated
by the markets. Nevertheless, a plausible explanation of our result regarding the effects
of supply–side shocks on stock market returns and volatility could lie on the fact that
recent disruptions of oil supply are not related to OPEC decisions, but are rather related to
unplanned oil supply disruptions caused by the Arab uprising, the oil theft in Nigeria and
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the closure of Libya’s ports. Such developments are expected to trigger negative responses
from the financial markets (i.e. lower returns and increased volatility).
Next, we concentrate on the country–specific results. A general comment regarding the
relations of interest is that we are able to point out specific differences not only between
groups, but also, within groups of countries. In particular, we notice that, with the excep-
tion of China, Japan and the US, all remaining net oil–importing countries in our sample
(i.e. the European countries) exhibit certain differences compared to their net oil–exporting
counterparts. As noted earlier, these differences are mainly related to the time–varying
features of the link between oil price shocks and the stock market.
Starting with the net oil–exporting countries, the empirical findings for Canada suggest
that, during turbulent times, aggregate demand shocks play a key role in the transmission
process of spillovers to the stock market. Specifically, during the years of the Great Recession
- especially at the heart of the crisis - aggregate demand shocks appear to be significantly
transmitted to both stock market returns and stock market volatility. This is somewhat
expected given the aforementioned analysis in connection with the importance of aggregate
demand shocks for the stock market. By contrast, aggregate demand shocks appear to
be of a rather lesser importance during tranquil times. In fact, during the more recent
years, it is the oil–specific demand and supply–side shocks which appear to be of greater
importance. As previously noted, the importance of aggregate demand shocks for net oil–
exporting countries has also been reported by Wang et al. (2013); however, this study
provides additional evidence which accounts for the time–varying role of both oil–specific
demand and supply–side shocks. Apergis and Miller (2009) also provide empirical evidence
suggesting that oil–specific demand shocks mildly affect stock market returns in Canada
without specifying though whether this influence relates to turbulent or tranquil periods.
On a final note, it is important to emphasize that, during the years of the crisis, supply–side
shocks were also on the transmitting end of spillovers to the Canadian stock market, although
to a lesser extent compared to spillovers originating from aggregate demand shocks. This
could potentially be explained on the basis of the importance of current availability of oil
during periods of recession for net oil–exporting countries (see, among others, Antonakakis
et al., 2014; Afonso and Furceri, 2010; Sturm et al., 2009), as well as, on the events that
have taken place since the Great Recession in the Middle East.
As far as Norway is concerned, results are qualitatively very similar to those reported for
Canada. However, both oil–specific demand and supply–side shocks seem to play a rather
greater role in the Norwegian stock market in recent years. Jung and Park (2011) and Wang
et al. (2013) also provide evidence of the persistent relation between the two demand–side
shocks and the Norwegian stock market; nevertheless, this study suggests that supply–side
shocks are also important at different time periods.
Turning to Russia, aggregate demand shocks appear to be important for stock market
returns and volatility in the early stages of the Great Recession and until the peak years
of the crisis. In addition, supply–side shocks are also important for both stock market
returns and volatility, especially from the peak years of the crisis onwards. By contrast,
oil–specific demand shocks do not appear to be important. This is in line with Antonakakis
et al. (2014) who further subscribe to the belief that for net oil–exporting countries, both
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aggregate demand and supply-side shocks appear to be important during periods of economic
downturn, while oil–specific demand shocks are likely to be more important during relatively
even–tempered economic periods. This is true for Russia, although we cannot report any
considerable spillover effects deriving from oil–specific demand shocks on the Russian stock
market until the very recent years of our sample period. A potential explanation of the
transition from aggregate demand shocks spillovers to supply–side shocks spillovers on the
Russian stock market during the years of the Great Recession may lie in the work of Bhar
and Nikolova (2010). These authors, put forward the argument (by referring to specific
oil–related global disturbances such as the terrorist attack of September 11th 2001 and the
2003 war in Iraq) that, although on the eve of any oil price shock, concerns within the
Russian economy are mainly demand driven. Eventually, at a later stage, Russia always
acts as a resilient supplier of oil on every disturbing occasion; thereby raising concerns for
future oil availability. In fact, Bhar and Nikolova (2010) provide historical evidence to
support the argument that during such events, oil production within Russia has typically
increased compared to production within other oil–producing countries. With regard to
the prominence gained in recent years by spillover effects deriving from oil–specific demand
shocks on the Russian stock market, authors such as Aleklett et al. (2010) explain that there
have been considerations recently, regarding future oil production and thus oil availability
within Russia; implying that a more targeted national policy regarding the security of future
oil resources is rather essential. Reiterating a point made earlier, concerns regarding the
future availability of oil in Russia (i.e. the resilient supplier) are likely to rise, especially in
view of escalating upheaval in the Middle East.
Next, we concentrate on the net oil–importers, starting with the the Chinese stock mar-
ket. We notice that during the years of the Great Recession, aggregate demand shocks are
very important in the transmission process of shocks to both Chinese stock market returns
and volatility; while clearly, supply–side shocks also assume a net transmitting role. Con-
versely, oil–specific demand shocks do not appear to be important throughout the years of
the crisis. In turn, in the post–2012 period, oil–specific demand shocks appear to be impor-
tant for Chinese stock market returns but not for stock market volatility. Considering that
China is the world’s second largest oil–importer (IEA, 2013), demand for oil can be a crucial
factor affecting both stock market returns and volatility. Thus, the fact that Chinese stock
market volatility is not receiving any spillover effects from oil–specific demand shocks in the
post–2012 period is rather unexpected. It is worth mentioning though, that in recent years,
authors such as Yuan et al. (2008), Zhang et al. (2009), as well as, Ma et al. (2012, 2011)
raise concerns about the future availability of oil in China and stress the necessity for the
formulation of appropriate governmental policies to secure oil reserves within the country,
and shield the country against abrupt rises in the price of oil. Hence, potentially the Chinese
stock market volatility does not currently react to oil–specific demand shocks anticipating
that the new policy initiatives will be successfully implemented.
In Japan, aggregate demand shocks appear to be the dominant transmitters of spillovers
to both stock market characteristics especially during the first years of the crisis; however,
these shocks seem to be more important in the transmisison process of spillover effects to
stock market volatility than to stock market returns. In addition, the same period is also
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characterised by the net transmitting role of oil–specific demand shocks. Empirical evidence
related to the results presented in our study, can be found in the work of authors such as
Abhyankar et al. (2013), who emphasize both the significant impact of aggregate demand
shocks and the negative impact of oil–specific demand shocks on Japanese stock market
returns. In addition, authors, such as Chang et al. (2013), emphasize that oil price shocks
are, in general, key factors in explaining stock market volatility in Japan. Turning to the
post–2012 period, spillover effects mainly originate from supply–side and oil–specific demand
shocks. These results are expected given the evidence provided by Abhyankar et al. (2013)
and Chang et al. (2013) and the aforementioned geopolitical events that have taken place
during this period.
Spillover effects during the years of the Great Recession in the US are mainly transmitted
from aggregate demand shocks, especially during the first years of the crisis. We should
note however, that this transmission process appears to be more important for stock market
returns. Our results suggest, though, that there is definitely a key role for supply–side and
oil–specific demand shocks during the latter part of our study. Once again, even in the
case of the US we observe the impact of the recent events in the Middle East in the stock
market returns and volatility. Our findings are somewhat in line with the empirical evidence
by Kilian and Park (2009), who argue that supply–side shocks are less important to the
US stock market, compared to the two demand–side shocks. Nevertheless, in this study we
point out that the importance of each oil price shock to stock market returns and volatility
cannot be examined in a static environment as it clearly depends on events that take place
at different time periods.
Finally, spillovers during the Great Recession in European countries are mainly originat-
ing from aggregate demand shocks. However, volatility in European stock markets appears
to also be influenced by both supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks. It is worth noting
that most existing studies on European stock markets concentrate on stock market returns
(i.e. excluding stock market volatility) within a static framework in order to provide evi-
dence that entails either a minimum or a negligible influence originating from supply–side
shocks. From the few studies focusing on the stock market volatility in Europe, Degiannakis
et al. (2014) provide specific evidence that it is aggregate demand shocks rather than the
other two that mostly influence volatility in European stock markets. Apparently, though,
at turbulent economic or geopolitical times, supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks are
also important for the volatility of European stock markets given that these shocks act as
transmitters of spillover effects too. Especially the net transmitting role of the oil–specific
demand shocks to both stock market returns and volatility in European countries that is
observed in the post–2012 period signifies the importance of the ongoing Middle East crisis
to these stock markets.
In conclusion, our results suggest that aggregate demand shocks are the main transmit-
ters of spillover effects to the stock markets during periods of economic turbulence, whereas
supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks seem to transmit spillover effects during periods
of geopolitical unrest. Our findings also indicate the importance of adopting a dynamic
approach so as to capture the relevance of each type of shock and to trace similarities and
differences between the various types of countries over time.
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5. Conclusion
Attaining deeper understanding regarding the relationship between oil price shocks and the
stock market appears to be of major concern to recent relevant literature. Contemporary
research in this field typically breaks down into three main strands; that is, (i) the inves-
tigation of the effects of oil price shocks on the stock market considering the origin of the
shock, (ii) the investigation of whether there exists a time-varying relationship between oil
prices and the stock market, as well as, (iii) the investigation of potential spillover effects
between the said markets.
In this respect, the main contribution of this study is that it combines all three afore-
mentioned strands of related literature in order to investigate spillover effects between oil
price shocks (i.e. shocks disaggregated by virtue of their origin) and 11 major stock mar-
kets of the world (including both stock markets of net oil-importing and of net oil-exporting
countries), within a time-varying framework. The period of the study spans from September
1995 to July 2013. The employed methodology is the one proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz
(2012), which in this study is being further extended by the application of a structural vec-
tor autoregressive framework that allows for the identification of the three different types of
oil price shocks. It follows that this study adds to existing literature not only in terms of
introducing new evidence regarding the relationship under investigation, but also, in terms
of further exploiting existing econometric methods.
Furthermore, this study concentrates on two stock market characteristics; namely, stock
market returns and stock market volatility. One of the major concerns of the authors is
to also investigate whether consistent results regarding the behaviour of both stock market
characteristics can indeed be obtained (whether, for example, a negative shock that triggers
negative responses from stock market returns also creates higher stock market volatility).
We employ both current (conditional and realised) and forward–looking (implied) measures
of stock market volatility in order to investigate whether the forward–looking measure can
indeed provide better information, as has been suggested by the literature.
The implementation of the specific econometric method allows for the investigation of
spillover effects from three different angles. In particular, we are able to calculate total,
directional, as well as, net spillover effects between oil price shocks and the stock market.
Total and directional spillover effects, draw a broader picture of the relationship under
investigation, providing information about the magnitude, the trend, as well as, the level
of spillover effects either received or transmitted by each one of the variables of the study.
Net spillover effects, on the other hand, provide specific information regarding the role of
each variable under investigation throughout the period of study (i.e. net transmitter or net
recipient of spillover effects). What is more, net spillover effects can be further specified in
order to facilitate a pairwise investigation approach (i.e. net effects between variables).
Empirical findings suggest that considering both a time–varying framework of study and
the disaggregation of oil price shocks by virtue of their origin is of cardinal importance. To be
more explicit, we provide evidence that spillover effects indeed vary across time and that their
direction and magnitude is closely related to global economic developments. Furthermore,
we find that not all types of oil price shocks transmit spillover effects to the stock market at
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the same time, but rather, this also depends on the specific period under investigation. More
specifically, considering net pairwise spillover effects, our evidence indicates that aggregate
demand shocks appear to be net transmitters of spillover effects to the stock market during
turbulent economic periods (e.g. during the years of the Great Recession), while both
supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks act as net transmitters of spillover effects during
periods characterised by intense global geopolitical unrest.
Results are also indicative of the fact that spillover effects may differ not only between
the two groups of countries under investigation (i.e. net oil–importing and net oil–exporting
countries) but also among the countries of each group. These differences can be partly
attributed to the time-varying character of the relationship between oil price shocks and
the stock market. What is more, we provide no evidence that the forward-looking measure
of stock market volatility provides superior information compared to the current-looking
measure.
Our findings are important to investors and portfolio managers who have positions to
both the oil and stocks and thus need to adjust their holdings according to spillovers trans-
mitted by both markets. In particular, investors should strongly consider the fact that
different oil price shocks transmit different spillovers over different time periods that result
in different correlations within a portfolio comprising investments in both markets. For in-
stance, spillovers from aggregate demand shocks tend to strengthen the co–movement of the
two markets, while spillovers from both supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks entail
negative correlation. These results are also important to investors who participate in the
options market given that volatility is the key component of option pricign. Thus, they need
to be aware of the time–varying nature of potential spillovers that oil price shocks transmit
to stock market volatility.
An exciting avenue for future research may include the examination of spillover effects
between oil price shocks and industrials sectors rather than aggregate stock indices. Aggre-
gate stock market indices may mask the individual characteristics of the industrial sectors.
Finally, spillover effects between oil price shocks and other financial assets (e.g. exchange
rates) and commodity price indices (e.g. gold or food), which form part of investment
portfolios, is an interesting area for further research.
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Figure 1: Oil production growth, oil returns, general economic activity & stock market returns
 
DLOilProduction 
2000 2010
-0.02
0.02 GEA 
2000 2010
-50
50 DLOilPrice 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2
DLS&P/TSX 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2
DLSSE 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2 DLIBEX35 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2
DLCAC40 
2000 2010
-0.1
0.1 DLDAX30 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2
DLFTSEITA 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2
DLNIKKEI225 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2
DLOSE 
2000 2010
-0.25
0.25
DLRTS 
2000 2010
-0.5
0.5
DLFTSE100 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2
DLS&P500 
2000 2010
-0.2
0.2
26
Figure 2: Stock market returns’ realised volatility, conditional volatility & implied volatility
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Figure 3: Total spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market returns
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Figure 4: Directional spillovers FROM oil price shocks and stock market returns to all others
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Figure 5: Directional spillovers TO oil price shocks and stock market returns from all others
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Figure 6: Net spillovers of oil price shocks and stock market returns
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Figure 7: Net pairwise spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market returns
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Figure 8: Total spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility
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Figure 9: Directional spillovers FROM oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility to all others
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Figure 10: Directional spillovers TO oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility from all others
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Figure 11: Net spillovers of oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility
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Figure 12: Net pairwise spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility
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Figure 13: Total spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility
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Figure 14: Directional spillovers FROM oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility to all others
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Figure 15: Directional spillovers TO oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility from all others
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Figure 16: Net spillovers of oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility
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Figure 17: Net pairwise spillovers between oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1995:09 – 2013:07
Series Obs Mean Std Min Max Skewness Excess Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF
∆ ln(S&P/TSX) 214 0.0060 0.0599 -0.3695 0.1612 -1.4062** 6.5226** 449.88*** -12.10**
∆ ln(SSE) 214 0.0061 0.0821 -0.2244 0.2642 0.3352* 0.4194 5.5767 -13.55**
∆ ln(IBEX35) 214 0.0037 0.0639 -0.2361 0.1595 -0.6319** 1.1885** 26.838** -13.64**
∆ ln(CAC40) 214 0.0035 0.0610 -0.2533 0.1205 -1.0182** 1.9321** 70.265** -13.34**
∆ ln(DAX30) 214 0.0059 0.0670 -0.2714 0.1674 -0.7328** 1.6925** 44.693** -13.32**
∆ ln(FTSEITA) 214 0.0002 0.0663 -0.2597 0.2328 -0.4310** 1.6908** 32.119** -13.89**
∆ ln(NIKKEI225) 214 -0.0010 0.0663 -0.2089 0.1965 -0.2930 0.8285* 9.1839* -14.99**
∆ ln(OSE) 214 0.0079 0.0742 -0.4369 0.1972 -1.2884** 5.3154** 311.13** -11.72**
∆ ln(RTS) 214 0.0122 0.1431 -0.6173 0.5408 -0.8889** 3.4226** 132.63** -12.02**
∆ ln(FTSE100) 214 0.0027 0.0519 -0.2704 0.1255 -1.2230** 3.4775** 161.18** -13.91**
∆ ln(S&P500) 214 0.0049 0.0478 -0.2729 0.1189 -1.1524** 4.5503** 231.99** -14.39**
∆ ln(OIL PRICE) 214 0.0087 0.0898 -0.3110 0.2007 -0.7755** 1.0657** 31.574** -11.93**
∆ ln(OIL PROD) 214 0.0012 0.0080 -0.0249 0.0259 -0.0877 1.0379** 9.8796** -15.05**
GEA 215 2.1896 27.674 -50.300 59.100 0.2286 -0.9843** 10.502** -2.993*
S&P/TSXRV 214 18.662 11.523 3.8878 103.42 3.2010** 16.880** 2987.7** -5.625**
SSERV 214 23.920 11.704 7.0870 82.426 1.4583** 2.7164** 145.61** -8.594**
IBEX35RV 214 23.389 12.714 3.2046 99.467 1.9250** 6.6881** 545.90** -6.133**
CAC40RV 214 22.681 12.319 5.3115 99.453 2.1910** 7.9025** 748.46** -5.788**
DAX30RV 214 23.325 12.549 4.7649 90.901 1.7591** 4.7469** 320.02** -5.885**
FTSEITARV 214 23.446 12.934 4.6273 96.709 1.8891** 5.6263** 421.02** -6.263**
NIKKEI225RV 214 23.152 10.558 2.3874 94.151 2.1821** 9.6313** 1024.9** -8.408**
OSERV 214 25.092 16.134 2.5305 121.67 2.5882** 9.4901** 1071.2** -5.429**
RTSRV 214 35.848 21.490 8.1671 150.17 1.8686** 5.0095** 358.06** -6.213**
FTSE100RV 214 18.753 11.131 3.3155 101.96 2.9811** 15.506** 2529.7** -6.091**
S&P500RV 214 17.442 10.105 6.5368 82.923 2.6828** 4.5503** 231.99** -5.677**
S&P/TSXCV 214 19.382 10.327 7.62 83.330 3.2923** 15.620** 2574.2** -3.904**
SSECV 214 27.692 9.4193 15.9 72.890 1.3310** 2.0001** 99.315** -5.800**
IBEX35CV 214 24.430 10.989 10.83 77.720 1.7970** 4.7329** 316.38** -4.550**
CAC40CV 214 23.572 10.390 12.28 77.990 2.1600** 6.6607** 564.61** -4.187**
DAX30CV 214 24.287 10.951 9.76 73.850 1.7473** 3.9558** 249.59** -4.362**
FTSEITACV 214 24.660 11.154 10.61 78.900 1.8456** 4.5224** 305.28** -4.592**
NIKKEI225CV 214 24.246 7.745 14.54 68.170 2.2301** 7.8911** 736.03** -5.773**
OSECV 214 26.345 14.153 11.68 108.12 2.7971** 10.813** 1327.7** -3.791**
RTSCV 214 39.010 19.942 17.8 137.10 1.8442** 4.0907** 271.78** -4.990**
FTSE100CV 214 19.506 9.5082 9.38 81.900 2.9814** 13.460** 1941.6** -4.442**
S&P500CV 214 18.125 9.1764 7.78 73.230 2.7666** 11.337** 1425.6** -4.495**
VCAC 163 24.206 9.2617 11.483 64.330 1.4167** 2.5517** 101.77** -3.923**
VDAX 214 24.842 10.168 10.580 64.110 1.4276** 1.8293** 80.492** -3.641**
VXJ 187 26.428 9.5090 13.580 76.350 2.4537** 7.9706** 613.29** -5.530**
VFTSE 163 21.286 9.3322 10.294 63.260 1.7085** 3.8682** 186.47** -4.060**
VIX 214 21.616 8.6736 10.050 69.250 2.1415** 7.2211** 493.42** -3.945**
Note: ADF denotes Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with 5% and 1% critical values of -2.88 and -3.46,
respectively. * and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Oil price shocks and stock market returns, spillover table (1995:09 – 2013:07)
CAN CHN
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 78.6 6.4 7.7 7.3 21.4 84.0 7.4 6.0 2.6 16.0
ADS 2.2 78.2 3.3 16.4 21.8 1.9 57.6 3.3 37.2 42.4
OSS 6.1 7.9 76.4 9.7 23.6 6.8 7.2 78.0 7.9 22.0
SMR 7.8 8.8 15.9 67.5 32.5 3.2 2.0 4.8 89.9 10.1
Contr. to others 16.1 23.0 26.9 33.4 Tot. Spillover 12.0 16.7 14.0 47.7 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 94.7 101.2 103.2 100.9 Index=24.8% 95.9 74.3 92.1 137.7 Index=22.6%
Net spillovers -5.3 1.2 3.3 0.9 -4 -25.7 -8 37.6
ESP FRA
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 81.6 7.2 6.4 4.8 18.4 81.8 6.4 6.6 5.2 18.2
ADS 2.1 85.2 4.4 8.3 14.8 2.6 82.2 3.9 11.4 17.8
OSS 6.0 6.8 80.7 6.4 19.3 6.3 7.6 79.8 6.3 20.2
SMR 8.8 7.6 2.6 81.0 19.0 7.7 7.4 8.4 76.5 23.5
Contr. to others 16.9 21.6 13.3 19.5 Tot. Spillover 16.6 21.4 18.9 22.9 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 98.6 106.8 94.1 100.5 Index=17.9% 98.4 103.6 98.7 99.4 Index=19.9%
Net spillovers -1.5 6.8 6 0.5 -1.6 3.6 -1.3 -0.6
GER ITA
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 83.6 5.9 6.0 4.5 16.4 82.1 6.3 6.9 4.7 17.9
ADS 2.5 83.1 3.8 10.6 16.9 2.8 87.1 5.3 4.8 12.9
OSS 6.9 7.7 78.7 6.7 21.3 6.0 6.9 79.9 7.2 20.1
SMR 9.2 7.0 4.0 79.9 20.1 11.9 8.5 4.6 74.9 25.1
Contr. to others 18.6 20.6 13.8 21.8 Tot. Spillover 20.7 21.7 16.9 16.7 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 102.2 103.6 92.5 101.7 Index=18.7% 102.8 108.7 96.8 91.6 Index=19.0%
Net spillovers 2.2 3.7 -7.5 1.7 2.8 8.8 -3.2 -8.4
JPN NOR
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 83.4 5.1 5.5 5.9 16.6 82.9 9.2 6.6 1.3 17.1
ADS 2.9 81.2 5.6 10.3 18.8 2.6 77.2 5.4 14.8 22.8
OSS 6.3 6.9 79.8 7.0 20.2 6.5 9.8 79.6 4.1 20.4
SMR 3.9 9.1 4.8 82.2 17.8 7.8 4.3 1.8 86.1 13.0
Contr. to others 13.0 21.1 16.0 23.2 Tot. Spillover 18.8 51.9 10.5 22.0 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 96.5 102.4 95.8 105.4 Index=18.3% 90.8 139.1 83.6 86.5 Index=25.8%
Net spillovers -3.6 2.3 -4.2 5.4 1.7 29.1 -9.9 9
RUS UK
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 77.7 11.1 5.2 6.1 22.3 82.9 7.6 6.6 2.9 17.1
ADS 2.3 76.7 2.9 18.1 23.3 2.5 88.6 3.8 5.1 11.4
OSS 8.5 9.2 71.3 10.9 28.7 6.6 7.5 79.3 6.5 20.7
SMR 1.4 4.0 1.6 93.0 7.0 9.4 8.2 7.9 74.6 25.4
Contr. to others 18.0 18.7 20.8 23.3 Tot. Spillover 18.5 23.3 18.3 14.6 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 99.9 103.6 96.5 100.1 Index=20.2% 101.4 111.9 97.6 89.1 Index=18.7%
Net spillovers -4.3 -4.6 -7.9 16.3 1.4 11.9 -2.4 -10.8
US
From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 79.9 7.7 6.4 6.0 20.1
ADS 2.5 91.2 4.0 2.3 8.8
OSS 6.6 8.6 76.6 8.2 23.4
SMR 9.5 9.1 6.6 74.8 25.2
Contr. to others 18.6 25.4 17.0 16.4 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 98.5 116.6 93.7 91.2 Index=19.4%
Net spillovers -1.5 16.6 -6.4 -8.8
Note: Spillover indices, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based on 12-
step-ahead forecasts.
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Table 3: Oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility, spillover table (1995:09 – 2013:07)
CAN CHN
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 79.0 8.1 7.3 5.6 21.0 82.4 7.6 6.0 4.0 17.6
ADS 2.0 89.4 4.1 4.5 10.6 2.6 92.3 3.6 1.5 7.7
OSS 6.9 8.4 75.3 9.5 24.7 5.1 10.1 80.7 4.0 19.3
SMRV 4.5 4.2 10.9 80.3 19.7 10.2 6.0 2.6 81.3 18.7
Contr. to others 13.4 20.8 22.4 19.5 Tot. Spillover 17.9 23.7 12.2 9.4 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 92.4 110.2 97.6 99.8 Index=19.0% 100.4 116.0 92.9 90.7 Index=15.8%
Net spillovers -7.6 10.2 -2.3 -0.2 0.3 16.0 -7.1 -9.3
ESP FRA
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 81.8 6.7 6.9 4.6 18.2 81.2 7.3 6.9 4.5 18.8
ADS 2.8 76.2 3.6 17.4 23.8 2.7 85.5 2.5 9.3 14.5
OSS 6.5 7.1 74.9 11.4 25.1 6.7 8.6 72.4 12.3 27.6
SMRV 2.4 3.7 7.4 86.5 13.5 8.3 5.9 6.0 79.8 20.2
Contr. to others 11.7 17.5 17.9 33.5 Tot. Spillover 17.6 21.8 15.4 26.2 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 93.5 93.7 92.8 120.0 Index=20.1% 98.8 107.3 87.8 106.0 Index=20.2%
Net spillovers -6.5 -6.3 -7.2 20 -1.2 7.3 -12.2 6
GER ITA
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 82.2 7.0 6.8 4.0 17.8 83.5 6.9 6.5 3.1 16.5
ADS 2.5 88.3 2.7 6.4 11.7 3.7 74.9 3.8 17.6 25.1
OSS 7.0 8.2 72.9 11.9 27.1 6.3 6.4 76.6 10.8 23.4
SMRV 9.3 6.7 4.4 79.6 20.4 6.0 6.2 7.8 80.0 20.0
Contr. to others 18.8 22.0 14.0 22.2 Tot. Spillover 16.0 19.5 18.2 31.4 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 101.0 110.3 86.9 101.8 Index=19.3% 99.5 94.3 94.7 111.4 Index=21.3%
Net spillovers 1.0 10.3 -13.1 1.8 -0.5 -5.6 -5.2 11.4
JPN NOR
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 78.4 7.5 5.8 8.3 21.6 82.5 7.5 6.6 3.4 17.5
ADS 1.7 90.0 2.7 5.6 10.0 2.2 86.9 3.8 7.2 13.1
OSS 7.7 9.9 73.4 9.0 26.6 6.2 7.4 71.5 15.0 28.5
SMRV 3.5 8.5 6.3 81.7 18.3 6.9 4.8 8.4 79.9 20.1
Contr. to others 12.9 25.9 14.8 22.9 Tot. Spillover 15.3 19.6 18.8 25.6 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 91.3 115.9 88.3 104.6 Index=19.1% 97.8 106.5 90.3 105.5 Index=19.8%
Net spillovers -8.7 15.9 -11.8 4.6 -2.2 6.5 -9.7 5.5
RUS UK
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 82.5 8.3 7.3 1.9 17.5 82.1 7.6 6.8 3.5 17.9
ADS 2.5 85.9 4.2 7.4 14.1 2.7 86.6 3.0 7.7 13.4
OSS 6.0 6.1 76.8 11.1 23.2 6.2 8.3 72.9 12.6 27.1
SMRV 2.8 2.8 2.8 91.6 8.4 10.2 5.3 6.9 77.6 22.4
Contr. to others 11.3 17.2 14.2 20.5 Tot. Spillover 19.1 21.2 16.8 23.7 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 93.8 103.1 91.0 112.1 Index=15.8% 101.2 107.8 89.7 101.3 Index=20.2%
Net spillovers -6.2 3.1 -9.0 12.1 1.2 7.8 -10.3 1.3
US
From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 78.4 7.8 7.7 6.1 21.6
ADS 2.4 88.2 4.0 5.5 11.8
OSS 6.9 7.9 78.1 7.0 21.9
SMRV 11.4 4.4 10.2 73.9 26.1
Contr. to others 20.7 20.1 21.9 18.6 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 99.1 108.3 100.0 92.6 Index=20.4%
Net spillovers -0.9 8.3 0.0 -7.5
Note: Spillover indices, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based on 12-
step-ahead forecasts.
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Table 4: Oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility, Spillover table
FRA GER
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMIV From others SS ADS OSS SMIV From others
SS 81.2 9.5 7.1 2.2 18.8 84.6 6.6 7.0 1.9 15.4
ADS 2.6 91.8 4.0 1.6 8.2 3.1 90.7 4.1 2.1 9.3
OSS 9.6 11.1 68.9 10.4 31.1 6.3 7.5 73.1 13.1 26.9
SMIV 25.7 7.9 5.6 60.8 39.2 14.5 8.9 5.1 71.5 28.5
Contr. to others 37.9 28.6 16.6 14.2 Tot. Spillover 23.9 23.0 16.2 17.1 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 119.1 120.4 85.5 75.0 Index=24.3% 108.5 113.7 89.2 88.6 Index=20.0%
Net spillovers 19.1 20.4 -14.5 -25.0 8.5 13.7 -10.7 11.4
JPN UK
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMIV From others SS ADS OSS SMIV From others
SS 77.5 7.7 7.4 7.4 22.5 76.6 10.3 7.3 5.8 23.4
ADS 1.8 90.1 3.8 4.3 9.9 3.6 91.5 3.8 1.1 8.5
OSS 6.7 9.7 79.6 4.0 20.4 8.8 11.4 67.5 12.3 32.5
SMIV 8.8 25.9 10.4 54.9 45.1 31.9 8.5 5.5 54.1 45.9
Contr. to others 17.4 43.3 21.6 15.7 Tot. Spillover 44.2 30.2 16.6 19.2 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 94.9 133.3 101.2 70.6 Index=24.5% 120.8 121.8 84.1 73.3 Index=27.6%
Net spillovers -6.5 -6.3 -7.2 20 -1.2 7.3 -12.2 6
US
From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMIV From others
SS 80.7 7.4 7.9 4.0 19.3
ADS 2.6 90.7 4.3 2.4 9.3
OSS 6.0 8.2 75.7 10.0 24.3
SMIV 8.2 9.8 10.8 71.2 28.8
Contr. to others 16.8 25.5 23.0 16.5 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 97.5 116.1 98.7 87.7 Index=20.4%
Net spillovers -0.9 8.3 0.0 -7.5
Note: Spillover indices, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based on 12-
step-ahead forecasts.
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